Book of Abstracts

Narrativity and Self-Creating Forms:

Autopoiesis in Perspective

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1. The Problem of Personal Identity: Philosophy and Literature

Sándor Albert (Szegedi Tudományegyetem)

It is no exaggeration to say that, before the modern era, no philosophical work was written focusing specifically on the *I*. Neither ancient nor medieval philosophers felt the need to clarify the meaning of the *I* in general or regarding themselves. Thus, it appears that establishing grand, culture-shaping philosophy is possible even without exploring the *I*. Still, the question *Who am I?* is as old as humanity itself, let's think of the well-known inscription in the Oracle of Delphi *Know thyself!* The change was brought about by Descartes and his most remarkable followers (Fichte, Husserl, Sartre, Russell and Ricœur). However, it was not only philosophers interested in personal identity, but also authors of numerous theological and literary works (Saint Augustine, Rousseau, Flaubert etc.). This is precisely why Paul Ricœur points out in his work *Oneself as Another* that literature provides a great opportunity to investigate the modality of personal identity, being a "vast laboratory" for these thought experiments.

In my talk, I am primarily going to take a look at this "vast laboratory" mentioned by Ricœur, concentrating on the possible interaction of philosophy and literature with regard to the question of personal identity.

In *Oneself as Another*, Ricœur divides literary narratives into large categories based on which modality of the person's identity and conservation in time is reflected in them. According to Ricœur, personal identity is created by two poles in a dialectic relationship and, depending on which pole is more dominant, there are two basic forms of our conservation in time. One of them can be described as a balance between the person's numeric identity and the fact that a person is "himself/herself": I remain the "same" in time, but I am also "myself". The former would be the identity understood as the "idem" *(same),* the latter as the "ipse" *(oneself).* The balance between the "idem" and the "ipse" corresponds to the character, which shows permanence and which remains unchanged and reidentifiable under all circumstances. This simple and clean type of the character can be found in folk tales, whereas its nuanced and more complex type can be traced in 18–19th century romantic and realistic novels. A fundamental problem with narratives is that there is a split appearing between being "oneself" and being "the same" in the course of the story, where *"selfhood frees itself from sameness"* .

In this respect, literary stories can be divided into two large groups. The classic novel – up until Dostoyevsky and Tolstoy – foregrounds the issue of the transformation of the person instead of the permanence of the character, thus gradually weakening (albeit not abolishing) the role of the identity as the "same". The Bildungsroman and the stream of consciousness novel on the other hand, are approaching the opposite pole. The character disappears, whereas borderline cases emerge which make literary fiction comparable to the thought experiments of analytic philosophy. In this case we can talk about the "loss of personality", which is in line with the crisis of the short story. This pole is represented primarily by Musil's *The Man Without Qualities*, but the novels of Kafka, Joyce and Proust also belong here.

2. Autopoesis and Ways of World Making in Contemporary French Poetry

Jeff Barda (University of Cambridge)

Since the end of the nineteenth century and namely through the influence of Mallarmé, French poetry has been engaged in questioning its own processes and methods. Through an investigation of language, many poets have shown that poetry relied on principles no longer dependent on a subjectivity but on a formal organization of language. In the recent years, many French poets have attempted to show how various forms of reflexivity could lead to a revaluation and a refashioning of the notion of poetic subject. In this presentation, I would like to examine some instances of this phenomenon by showing how recent poetic practices stand in stark contrast with the avant-garde models. Focusing on various forms of autopoesies in recent poetic experiments, I would like to show how these new poetic practices not only provide new models to think about the social structures that surround our existence (in particular in relationship to technology and media), and offer a pluralization of world views.

3. Paradoxes of Self-Creation and Narrativity in the Symbolist Novel

Eva Voldřichová Beránková (Univerzita Karlova, Praha)

"The novel can only survive if it becomes something else than what is still called a novel." (J. K. Huysmans, 1905)

At the height of his glory, Émile Zola was a veritable "machine for novels", publishing a new book of several hundred pages each year and gradually setting up the enormous building of the *Rougon-Macquart. Natural and Social History of a Family under the Second Empire*. His "experimental novel technique" (definition of a problem => working hypothesis => observation of the facts => experimentation => confirmation or reversal of the hypothesis => interpretation of the results and conclusion), as well as his legendary work ethic allowed him to reign over French letters, imposing on them a strict determinism, an unshakeable faith in progress and the use of "realistic" narrative forms, the most likely ones to illustrate accurately "mechanisms of human and social phenomena".

When the Symbolists and Decadents undertake to "break the Zolean machine" in the name of free will, self-creation, skepticism in the face of History and the "right to dream", they face a major technical problem: how to continue to write novels (required by the public, that even the most fortunate among them could not snub completely) without falling into the old naturalist recipes? According to the famous quote from Jules Renard: "the new formula of the novel [would be] not to make novel." Indeed, in their struggle against determinism, the new novelists first attack the traditional narrativity (chronological accounts of events linked by cause-and-effect relationships), then they deconstruct the characters and the logical background of their stories. Nevertheless, can we still talk about "novel" when a "young single living in a tour surrounded by swamps" meditates on his states of mind and the best way to furnish his house, without ever going outside, talking to anyone and living the slightest "story"?

The solution proposed by the Symbolists consists in the elaboration of a "novel of extreme consciousness", a philosophic-ontological genre that allows to grasp the inner life of a subject that self-analyzes and builds himself progressively. At this stage, self-creativity seems to oppose and exclude narrativity, since the authors mix their novels with such genres as lyric poems, prose poems or diaries and such figures as ekphrases, enumerations, catalogs, etc. However, despite the experimental richness of such a laboratory of new novelistic forms, the results are not always convincing on the artistic level, without taking into account the public, who quickly tires of stories that "tell nothing". In the long run, a certain return to narrativity seems inevitable. It is precisely the search for these new non-naturalistic narrativities, which are likely to engender modern self-reflection and self-creativity, that will be the subject of my presentation, based on several works by Remy de Gourmont, Édouard Dujardin and André Gide.

4. "Absurd Reversal"? Yes, Please! The Discursive Paradox of Autopoiesis in Hegel's Lectures on the Proofs of the Existence of God

Giulia Bernard (Università degli Studi di Padova)

This paper defends an utterly unconventional reading of the Hegelian *Lectures on the Proofs of the Existence of God* and argues that this often-neglected text provides us with a challenging account of the odd paradox that inhabits the peculiar autopoietic form of a process, whose enactment is staged just as its alleged purely epistemic narrative is said to fail to understand the proper ontological mediation of the Absolute. In the light of the methodological remarks in the *Preface to the second edition* of *The Science of Logic* I contend that a radical dialectical interpretation of Hegel's 1829 definition of the *elevation to God* as "the sublation of the one-sidedness of subjectivity" is needed to understand the Hegelian response to Jacobi's caveat against the "absurd reversal" (*Enz.* §36) arising from the finite mediation, whose inappropriate rhythm would put in crisis the Absolute's independence. Firstly, I present the common reading of this impasse, according to which the Hegelian solution would consist, on the one hand, in restricting such discursive contradictions, arising in the elevation, to its purported "subjective nature" and, on the other, in the removal of their disruptive potential from an Absolute, which is said to be mediated just with itself, in its transparency. Secondly, I show how this proposal, what I call a "deflationary reading of the finite mediation", ends up in an unconvincing postulation of two kinds of "mediation" – one proper to the finite subjectivity, the other owned by the Absolute – and in an unbearable form of objectivism. This, I claim, thirdly, prevents the understanding of the peculiar dialectical action at stake: right when it is *said* to be "only in the act of proving […] only [in] our knowledge" and to fail to retrospectively produce its alleged ontological cause – in that its elevation would end up in making the Absolute into something conditioned –, its disruptive performance produces a split *into* the Absolute, by inscribing the failed perspective of establishing itself as the proper effect of that cause into the ontological deadlock of the spirit itself. Rather than displaying a movement which is owned in the first place either *by the* Absolute or *by the* Finite, the gesture in which the Absolute relinquish the appearance of its autarkic hypostatization and the Finite gives up its stubborn permanence performs an action that cannot be disjointed from the discursive paradox of its narration. What the dialectical reversals of this epistemic process turn out to be is thus, I suggest, nothing but the autopoietic action, never given once for all, that stages a gesture of subjectivation of spirit, which is anti-subjectivist to the very extent that it gives body to the paradoxical discursivity of its (alleged finite) narrativity.

5. Dietetics of the Soul and the Invention of Inwardness in Biedermeier Literature: Ernst von Feuchtersleben's Philosophy of the Self as a Program for Political Emancipation

Jean Boutan (Sorbonne-Université, Paris)

Physician Ernst von Feuchtersleben's major philosophical work *Zur Diätetik der Seele* [On Dietetics of the Soul] (1838) enjoyed great popularity in pre-1848 Vienna, and its large echo in the literary circles of that time definitely set the tone for the inward retreat movement, that seems so typical for the whole culture and literature of the so-called *Biedermeier* period. Cultivation of inwardness, the promotion of self-reflexing literary forms such as the diary, and a philosophy that verges on modern-days personal development, situate the work at the intersection between psychology and aesthetics, bringing Feuchtersleben in the closeness of another non-Hegelian philosopher, that obtained an equally large reception in the Central European philosophy tradition of that time: namely Friedrich Herbart, with whom he also shared great interest for educational matters.

Still, notwithstanding his contribution to a theoretical definition of Biedermeier amidst romantic Europe, Feuchtersleben's philosophy of the Self is generally being overlooked in scientific literature about the development of modern subjectivity throughout literature. We assume that a closer examination of his work, with regard to the literary context it interacted with, would eventually reveal the political relevance of inward retreat and self-reflexion in the poetics of Biedermeier literature. Indeed, the care of the Self the author pleads for shall not only render one's life peaceful and harmonious, quite in accordance with the irenical ideology of post-Congress of Vienna Austrian Monarchy; it also aims at ensuring the independence of the subject in a world of trouble and violence, and thus, grants the individuals a space for free, even though private self-expression, as well as an occasion for political dissent.

Franz Grillparzer's diary, himself a personal friend of Feuchtersleben, might show how these ideas furthered a liberatiosn of thought, be it in the private sphere: Biedermeier authors nevertheless often proved more progressive than their Northern-German counterparts from the allegedly socialistic movement of Young Germany. *Zur Diätetik der Seele* actually promoted the development of inwardness as a pendant to political repression: self-reflexivity and self-creation became part of an emancipation program. The "myth of inwardness" – to borrow Jacques Bouveresse's words on Wittgenstein – appears to be a politically determined construct, supposed to guarantee space for freedom to the individuals living in a restorative state such as Chancellor Metternich's Austria.

Such a meditative poem as Friedrich Rückert's *Die Weisheit des Brahmanen* [The Wisdom of the Brahmins] (1836-1839) attest a symmetry between the care of inwardness on the one hand and state repression on the other, and thus exemplify the correlation between philosophy of the Self and philosophy of the state. Even the inner conflict (*Zerrissenheit*), that German scholar Friedrich Sengle pointed out among

others in the works of Nikolaus Lenau, might be interpreted as the expression of a frustrated longing for collective and social cohesion: the same motif leads by the Czech poet Karel Hynek Mácha to individual revolt and "dissension" of inner and outer worlds (*Rozbroj světů*). Self-reflexivity in Biedermeier and romantic aesthetics hence opens a new space for the worlds of dissents.

6. Autopoiesis and Life in Hegel's *Science of Logic*

Emmanuel Chaput (University of Ottawa)

In this paper, I address the issue of Hegel's *Science of Logic* as a self-producing system of thought developing itself through a process of self-contradiction and reconciliation. Such a process could be read in a way as an anticipation of the notion of autopoiesis later developed by the biologists Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela. The processualism and self-development of the concept through the progressive determination of logical categories, from the most abstract (or indeterminate) determinations of Being and Nothingness to the most concrete form of the concept could thus be read as the narrative of thought's self-development. As a narrative, the *Science of Logic* is accordingly a *graphê*, a written account of the progressive and autonomous determination of thought which takes, for Hegel, the form of a *bio*-graphy, or rather, of an *auto-bio-graphy of thought*. Indeed, in as far as the self-development of thought within the *Logic* is conceived as an autopoietic process which, following Hegel, one could call the "logical life" of thought, and as far as this process appears as entirely immanent to the self-configuration of thought within itself, one could, as a matter of fact, consider the *Science of Logic* as Hegel's conception of an autobiography of thought. Such a hypothesis, however, begs the question: In what sense can we refer to *Hegel*'s book *Science of Logic* as an *auto*-biography of thought, since Hegel nevertheless remains its author? To resolve the question, we must, in my view, at first determine what is meant by this "logical life" that constitute in a way the soul of the Hegelian logic and which allows to understand his work as a kind of *bio*-graphical account of the constitutive developments of the fundamental categories of thought in the form of a pure and dialectical logic. Secondly, we shall consider the self-motion and auto-referential aspects of this logical development which justify the fact that one could consider it as an *auto*-biography of thought that must be distinguished from Hegel's account of life within the spheres of nature or spirit. Along the way, we shall consider whether or not Hegel's account of logic as a dialectically self-producing living system could indeed be seen as an anticipation of the notion of autopoiesis and in what sense, on the contrary, Hegel's conception of logical thought as a self-producing, autopoietic narrative differs from the positions held by Maturana and Varela.

7. Autopoiesis and Translation: Symmetry and Asymmetry in Historical Life

Gaetano Chiurazzi (L'Università di Torino)

Hegel speaks of life in several parts of his system: here we will consider in particular the section of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* that concerns the passage from Consciousness to Self-consciousness, and the section about Teleology in the Doctrine of the Concept of the *Science of Logic*. In the former, Hegel describes the structure of life as the appearing of infinity from the reciprocal relations of the intellect. As many authors have highlighted, the recursive and reflective nature of this structure shares many points in common with the concept of autopoiesis drawn up by Maturana and Varela (M&V). Consciousness, which emerges from life, confirms such a hypothesis, since even consciousness is, for Hegel, autopoietic and self-growing. In the latter section, Hegel emphasizes the teleological dimension of life, in opposition to mechanism and chemism. This point provides an element of differentiation as to the notion of autopoiesis. In fact, in contrast to Aristotle--and most of ancient thought--who defined the autonomy of the living being on the basis of a finalistic principle, autopoiesis is presented by M&V as a mechanistic principle which does not presuppose any external factor to the physical universe. The difference between living and non-living machines lies, according to them, exclusively in their organization: a living machine is guided by a homeostatic principle, which allows it to produce its own components and to maintain its own organization, namely, the relations subsisting among them. The invariance of the organization (of the form) is therefore the necessary and sufficient feature of living beings. We can then distinguish non-living machines (allopoietic), living machines (autopietic), and finalized machines (heteropoietic).

What we want to explore here is the role that the notion of teleology—and the connected notion of desire, which also appears in the part of the *Phenomenology* considered here—plays in the Hegelian conception of life. This inquiry will be pursued by considering a passage of Hegel's text where the teleological principle is understood as the "translation of the concept into objectivity", which allows the identity of the subject to be reconstructed with the object, which had been severed in the teleological process itself. Whereas autopoiesis presupposes identity and can be understood as explaining only what is already implicit in the subject, heteropoiesis reconfigures identity, which therefore cannot fail to undergo a real transformation. The concept of translation arrives here to help. Translation is often misunderstood as a process that merely preserves an identity or an equivalence, we could even say, a symmetry; rather, translation shows that a lack of equivalence is unavoidable and produces asymmetries which reveal the transductive (oriented), transformative (differential) and irreversible (historical) nature of life. The question is, however, whether this irreversibility must be considered exclusively as a feature of cultural life (to which the concept of translation properly belongs), and thus of the order of sense and of human design (as M&V claim), or whether it should also be extended to biological life, as the creation of new irreversible and heteropoietic forms that in this way limit—or complicate—the mechanistic principle that characterizes autopoiesis.

8. Which One is Truly Autopoietic? The State and Civil Society in Hegel

Emre Ebeturk (University of Georgia)

Hegel provides his most detailed theory of politics in his *Philosophy of Right*,[1] where he often refers to the state as an organism.[2] For Hegel, organism in general refers to the objectivity of the living individual and is bound up with its subjectivity. But in Hegel's system, life is before all a *logical category*. Conceived independently of its natural or social realizations such as the animal or the state, the logical category of life stands for a special kind of purposiveness; a distinctive means-end relationship where the means coincide with the end, or more precisely, where the very activity that realizes the end is itself a self-realizing end. By laying out the structure and process of self-realization and distinguishing this form of being from artifacts and merely mechanical-chemical processes, Hegel offers a general account of self-organization that is by and large in agreement with contemporary autopoietic theories of life and society. The first moment of the logic of life explicates the internal constitution and the organic unity of the living individual regardless of whether it is considered as a natural organism or a state. Similar to a natural organic unity, the state is self-regulating by means of an internal differentiation of organs that serve one another and constitute a universal identity. Such a system needs more or less regular activities which the organism can subordinate to its end of determining and sustaining its internal constitution. For the state, institutions stand for the differentiated organs while their functions comprise the totality of self-governing activity. Likewise, similar to geochemical cycles that natural organisms presuppose, what precedes the state is a self-regulating system of individual wills that consciously recognize and realize one another as free in and through a network of freely chosen pursuits of private ends where each provides for the others. This system is akin to what Plato calls the city of pigs, and denotes the initial character of civil society broadly conceived before it is carried to its logical conclusions.[3] Nevertheless, Hegel thinks that such a system of needs, even before it necessarily undermines its self-determination, falls short of the objective self-determination realized by the state proper.

In this paper, I examine whether Hegel's conception of the state or the civil society is more closely aligned with contemporary conceptions of autopoietic systems. To this end, I focus on two crucial and interdependent aspects of Hegel's theory of life and of the state. First, I underline the fact that in Hegel's system, both animal life and the state are embodiments of the Idea, which incorporates the self-differentiating triadic structure of the Concept. Second, in connection with Hegel's conception of the unifying element of this structure, the moment of individuality, I explain why true subjectivity is indispensable to Hegel's logic of life and his theory of the state, whereas

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[1] Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, *Outlines of the Philosophy of Right*, Oxford University Press, 2008 [hereafter cited as *PR*, followed by paragraph number].

[2] See *PR* §46, §49, §267, §269, §270R, §271A, §278R, §286, §302R, §308R.

[3] Plato. *Complete Works*, Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997, 1008–1011. Also see *PR* §183.

subjectivity is only implicit in his concepts of rudimentary life and civil society. Within the framework of these two points, I point out how these distinctions correspond to the debates concerning the place of subjectivity and cognition in contemporary theories of autopoiesis.

9. Self-Referentiality in Narrative Literary Fiction: A Strategy of Autopoiesis or Autodestruction?

Bohumil Fořt (Masarykova univerzita, Brno)

Narrative literary fiction, during its long lasting history, has developed and practiced various self-referential techniques and strategies. The general reader's experience tels us that self-referentiality in the realm of narrative literary fiction can take on multiple forms with multiple effects. Some of the forms refer to a particular style or method that are conventionally connected with a certain artistic genre, period or trend, others are firmly connected to a unique writer's idiolect. Nevertheless, once we want to grasp literary fictional self-referentiality in a theoretical way, I believe, the individual reader's experience has to be combined with genelogical and developmental patterns and self-referentiality should be viewed as a historical phenomenon surrounded by other intertwined categories, such as purpose – tool (technique) – effect – function.

If we try to employ even a more theoretical (or more thorough) view of self-referentiality in literary narrative fiction, we have to pay our attention to two connected context which are firmly bound to this phenomenon: narrativity and fictionality. And indeed, it seems that self-referentiality has got the potential of being either a booster or enhancer of narrativity and fictionality or just to be their best fellow or caretaker but it also has the potential of deceasing or destroing them. In the pace of the development of narrative fictional literary forms, one can witness multiple examples of all the above mentioned connection between self-refereantiality on one side and fictionality and narrativity on the ozher – some of them well described and analysed, some of them noticed and mentioned, some left untouched.

In my contribution I want to touch upon several examples of self-referentiality in literary fiction with connection to their particular techniques and strategies, their historical and artistic contexts, and also with their purpose, function and effect they cause. The tools I am going to use are going to be borrowed from narrative theory, fiction theory, and fictional worlds theory. I believe that using these means will allow us to see self-referentiality as a means for the development of a series of several essential moves in narrative literary fiction and these moves can be detected at any of the above mentioned level self-referentiality is connected to: technological, historical, ertistic, functional, harrative, and fictional. The moves in play will help us to be able to grasp self-referentiality in narrative literary fiction as a phenomenon which can be essential for a self-establishment, demarcation, and development of particular forms and periods, and therefore as an autopoietic tool *par excellence*, on the one side of the spectrum, but also a phenomenon subversing fictionality and narrativity, and therefore a powerful tool of autodistraction of narrative literary fiction, on the other.

Examples coming from particular works, periods, and genres of narrative literary fiction will be provided.

10. Self-Moking as Self-Making: The Metamorphoses of Momus and the Diffraction of the Autopoiesis (Central-European Literatures)

Xavier Galmiche (Sorbonne-Université, Paris)

A large number of comic works from the field of literature or fine arts (and sometimes both, in the case of illustrated texts) of the late eighteenth century and the first half of the nineteenth century illustrate a tipping point in relation to the trivial. On the one hand, in accordance with the rules of the heroicomical genre, they tend to play against each other the poles of the noble and the humble, the top and the bottom, the sublime and the trivial. In the 18th century, the heroicomic genre was associated with self-referentiality modeled on the work of writers or sometimes philosophers such as Sterne or Diderot, and which can be considered the literary mode par excellence of the Autopoiesis.

But on the other hand, the radical changes in the production and dissemination of culture, which we could characterize as the first wave of massification, lead to a reverse tendency, where the trivial tends to be cultivated for its own sake: not only, therefore, comic trivialization, but the trivialization of the comic. A good example of this contradiction can be found in the metamorphoses of the Abderitan motif in the national literatures of Central Europe (Galmiche 2011): its "launch" is marked by the publication of the famous novel by Wieland (*Geschichte der Abderiten*, 1774), an adaptation of the German matter of the ancient criticism of Philistinism; but the "Neo-Abderitan" vogue (the resumption of the motif and its declination in the context of different national cultures) is characterized by a striking diversification of the criteria of beauty and decency, and even to a concession to bad taste (which will lead, mutatis mutandis, to modern kitsch).

The metamorphoses of Momus, considered as the ancient genius of the mocking, represented by the features of a grimacing figure and the incarnation of persiflage in Greek mythology, are an illustration of this: this scholarly motif, at least partially resulting from the diffusion of the works of Lucien (Baumann), resurfaced thanks to "the historical and typological development of the heroic-comic genre in European literatures" (to repeat the title of the first part of Krejčí's book). but sometimes we can see "new Momus" (the expression is found in the works of a Hungarian poet, Gvadányi since 1796) at the price of a blatant extension of the original code: the antique archetype adapts to aesthetic nuances in phase with the metamorphoses of taste, notably gentrification and modernization. This mutation obviously has an impact on the functioning of self-referentiality, which, far from the subtle rules of irony that gave rise to it, accepts to comply with the "bad genre".

The purpose of this contribution is to analyze this evolution of the Autopoiesis, which threatens its quasi-religious solemnity, through various texts of the national literatures of Central Europe.

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11. The Dialogical Development of "Wir" in Hegel's *Phänomenologie des Geistes*

Annet Goudriaan (Universiteit Utrecht)

In this paper, I aim to show that Hegel's dialectical method can be interpreted as a form of dialogue or dialogic, in which there is a continual openness to what is initially perceived as other-than-itself, and which allows for the unfolding, development and transformation of the subject of the *Phänomenologie*: the '*Ich*, das *Wir,* und *Wir*, das *Ich* ist'. The term dialogic was first coined by Mikhail Bakhtin, who made a sharp distinction between what he saw as the monologic enterprise of Hegelian dialectics – in which, Bakhtin claimed, all the voices that make themselves heard are ultimately synthesized into one – and the dialogic, in which a polyphony of different voices will continue to co-exist and remain involved in a process of mutual questioning and explication. I will argue – against and with Bakhtin – that a striving for openness is an integral aspect of Hegel's dialectics: in the way the different shapes of consciousness are allowed to interact on their journey towards absolute knowing, by allowing for a dialogue between Hegel's text and other (literary) texts, and, finally, by challenging the reader to become part of thinking as an intersubjective process.

I will develop my argument by taking a closer look at two passages in the *Phänomenologie* in which language is given a central role in allowing consciousness to develop its understanding of itself: the initial experience of consciousness as sense-certainty and its attempts to determine and express its experience, and its final experience in the shape of the beautiful soul. In his discussion of the latter Hegel shows that in order to further develop *Geist*'s potential we cannot remain locked within the purity of the good will – the perspective of *die schöne Seele* – but will have to embark on an exchange with what is initially experienced as alien, and as a possible threat to what we take to be our 'pure' subjectivity: the immaculate character of our interior motives.

In absolute knowing as the culmination of the dialectical – or dialogical – process of thinking we do indeed find resolution, but this resolution – which is ultimately attained by spirit's complete relinquishing ('Entäußerung') of its former shapes and which thus entails a radical transformation of subjectivity – is by no means monologic and manifests itself as the opening up of an infinity of potential connections to be made in the practice of thinking.

12. A "Small World": Cosmic Aspect and Self-Regulation in Works of Art

Holger Gutschmidt (Česká akademie věd, Praha)

During the last 200 years, there have been so many discussions, especially among philosophers, about the nature and the experience of works of art that some have already spoken of a "philosophical disenfranchisement" of art (Danto 1986). But it seems as if the question of which kind of object works of art are and how they present their aesthetic message, is still an open one. Many authors have argued that a work of art cannot be understood without a corresponding aesthetic experience (one of the first was Kant 1790). Others have tried to define form and content of the aesthetic experience (one of the first was Hegel, 1817sqq). My contribution generally supports the idea that the experience of a work of art is the key for its understanding, but it refuses any relativistic connotation possibly linked to that idea (Bertram 2005). In the contrary, in an aesthetic experience we *do* have an "essentialist" and "cognitivist" attitude towards the object. All interpretations, accordingly, which try to undermine or restrain such convictions, contradict to what we experience.

On the other hand, it is obvious how difficult the interpretation of objects of art often is. Hence, modern interpreters have argued that works of art are characterized by ambiguity and open symbols (Goodman 1968, Eco 1976) or that they are intrinsically negative towards our aesthetic conventions and expectations (Adorno 1970). Even if this often holds true for modern art, it does not seem to be a sufficient understanding of *all* art. And even if it holds true for a particular object of art, it does not make interpreting this object a merely arbitrary undertaking. Therefore, in order to understand an aesthetic object (i.e. the object of art *in* the corresponding aesthetic experience) it is useful (if not necessary) to consider it as something creating a "small world" (Goethe; compare also Croce 1902) within the realm of experience and due to the way of how this very object is made / structured. So, instead of expecting one single message from the work of art and, if impossible, considering it merely as an open symbol, the work of art has to be seen as a symbol of a small world. This world is "small" in the sense that it symbolizes (interprets) only a section of the real world, but it is a "world" in the sense that it is a potentially infinitely deep symbol of this section. In my contribution, I will present this concept of the aesthetic experience and the work of art presented by it in greater detail, and I also will give an account of what can be called the "self-regulatory" authority of the experienced work of art as creating such a "small world".

13. Translation as a Self-Reflexive Transformative Practice: Some Remarks on Speculative Nature of Translation

Saša Hrnjez (Università degli Studi di Padova)

My paper deals with the concept of translation as a self-reflexive, transformative process which cannot be reduced to a mere communicative exchange between languages. In that regard, it will be necessary to advance the idea that translation is a transformational practice precisely because it is self-reflexive. In doing so, my first step is to analyze speculative and dialectical connotations of the German term for translation, i.e. "Übersetzen" through Hegelian categorial apparatus. Exactly this apparatus will allow us to analyze the self-reflexive logic of translational process which consists in maintaining the self-reference in the relationship to the other. By deploying some paragraphs of Hegel's Doctrine of Essence in his Science of Logic (i.e. the relationship between positing (*setzen*), presupposing (*voraussetzen*) and transposing/translating (*übersetzen*)) three main thesis will be argued: 1) translating is not a mere transition (*Übergehen*) from one language to another one; 2) translating is the becoming-other in which that what becomes is preserved in its otherness, in what has become; 3) translating is, in sum, a profoundly relational process. These three points, exposed in the Hegelian framework, will, however, serve us to face the following questions: Is the relationship between languages really reflexive and what does it mean that translation has the reflexive or retroactive structure? Is there a counter-effect of the translated text on the original? And moreover, is there a counter-effect of the translating language on the language in which the text is originally written? In the next step, I will continue with the analysis of the speculative character of the German term "Übersetzen" by taking into account Walter Benjamin's seminal text "The Task of the Translator". In this text Benjamin points out that the original text survives (*überlebt*) in its translations and only its continuous transformation through other languages can give it a second life, a post-maturation, in Benjamin's terms. Benjamin's perspective will be helpful to show the fundamentally transformational nature of translation. The special attention then will be payed to the relation between the poetic work and translation in order to discuss certain Benjamin's insights regarding the particular relation that translation maintains with the language. I will argue that the self-reflexive structure of translation, similar to that one set forth in the first part of this paper, can be found also in Benjamin's idea on pure language that emerges in translational act: it is by virtue of its reflective nature that translation opens up a "superior" space in which the pure nature of language itself shines through. In conclusion, I will try to make some remarks regarding the relation between translation, poetic work and *poiesis*. Is translation to be considered as an act of *poiesis* or rather as an act of *praxis*? Moving from Benjamin's idea I will try to conclude that translation, due to its self-reflexive structure of the self-reference in the relation to the otherness, continuously withdraw itself from the domain of *poiesis*, where traditionally it has been placed. Translation has the character of a self-reflexive, transformative praxis in which its product coincides with the act of producing.

14. Narrative Ontology

Axel Hutter (Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität, München)

The main difference between reality and narration seems to be that it is only a defining characteristic of narrations to have sense. In sharp contrast, reality must not be intelligible like a text to be real. Narrations must make sense, the reality not – for the common understanding of reality that is the guiding difference.

However, by identifying being with nonsense one is left with one question. How can the puzzling irritation of sense come to pass? Because when reality as reality is nonsensical, then there arises the obvious problem, how under this condition sense is even possible? How does the appearance of sense get into the pure nonsensical being?

My talk will argue that the concept of a purely nonsensical being and the correlating concept of a purely illusional sense is false. Sense and being are a dialectic unity. The task of philosophy in the 21st century will be to make this unity explicit and to protect it against misunderstandings.

15. The Self-Creating Life-Form of Persons

Heikki Ikäheimo (INSW Sydney)

In this talk I will elaborate on three broadly Hegelian ideas. Firstly, that the subjective and objective aspects of 'spirit' (*Geist*), that is to say the psychological and social structures of distinctive of persons and their life, are co-constitutive elements of a whole. This whole is the human life-form. Secondly, that recognition or *Anerkennung* as self-transcendence and inclusion of otherness is ontologically constitutive of both, and key to their internal interrelations. Thirdly, that though freedom as autonomy is distinctive of this life-form, thought on the model of abstraction from necessarily determining otherness it is theoretically mistaken and put in practice pathological of the life-form in a literal sense of 'pathology'.

16. Autobiography and the Creation of Human Nature: Rousseau's Confessions and the Place of Pity within his Moral Psychology

David James (University of Warwick)

On the one hand, human nature is meant to be something objective, in that it concerns features that are held to characterize the human being as such. These essential features can then be used to explain social forms. On the other hand, our access to human nature, assuming that there is such a thing, has a subjective dimension, because the identification of these features will, in the first instance, be undertaken from the standpoint of the individual who infers what these features are, either from the behaviour of others or from his or her own beliefs, desires and experiences. In this paper, I focus on self-observation as the source of a theory of human nature, by linking Rousseau's claims concerning the value of his own autobiography as a guide to human nature together with one of the formative experiences that he describes in the *Confessions* to the place that pity occupies in his writings. Rousseau can be seen, I shall argue, to create human nature, and thus something that is held to extend beyond his own self, at the same time as he tells a story about himself. Importantly, Rousseau's account of pity is situated within a social theory, thus inviting a further question: to what extent are our views on human nature determined by society? The way in which Rousseau's writings invite such questions makes him a key thinker of modernity.

17. Narrative Voice, Autopoiesis and the Outside

Ian James (University of Cambridge)

In his the essay 'La Voix narrative', published in 1969 in *L'Entretien inifin*, Maurice Blanchot writes 'Le «il» narrative destitue toute sujet, de même qu'il désapproprie toute action transitive ou toute possibilité objective' [The narrative 'he' makes destititute any and all subject, in the same way that it disappropriates all transitive action and all objective possibility]. Blanchot's understanding of narrative voice points to the way in which literary language, in a movement he ascribes to the 'neuter' of the impersonal pronoun here, exposes all thought and sense to a radical outside or exteriority which is irreducible to any ontological disclosure or phenomenological manifestation and appearance. The 'outside', in its impossibility of disclosure or capture by thought, de-situates and interrupts subjectivity itself understood as a foundation or ground of experience. This Blanchottian thinking of narrative voice is taken up by Jean-Luc Nancy in his readings of Descartes and Kant in particular in the 1970s and 1980s. For Nancy, the foundational aspiration of philosophy as articulated in both the Cartesian cogito and the Kantian transcendental unity of apperception are understood as a certain modality of the self-narration, self-fictioning, and thus autopoiesis, of philosophical subjectivity in general which, in its exposure to a radical exteriority, once again, as it does in Blanchot, makes destitute or un-grounds that very subjectivity which it intends to ground or set onto solid foundations.

This paper will take up the legacy of this questioning such as it is framed and articulated by Blanchot and Nancy relation to literature and philosophy and it will do so in order to resituate the specificity of narrative voice and its exposure to the 'outside' in relation to scientific discourse. The initial point of reference here will be Varela and Maturana's seminal 1991 text, *Autopoiesis and Cognition: the realization of the living*, and its framing of autopoiesis as the unity of living organisms in a mode of self-affection or self-reference which defines the living as such and makes possible the emergence of cognition and consciousness. The 'outside' for Varela and Maturana is located in the perspective of the biologist, treating the organism as an object from a position exterior to it, whereas the organism itself is seen as a closed self-referential unity. Critiquing this position, and the closure of autopoiesis in Varela and Maturana more generally, the paper will reconfigure the self-reflexive 'sense' of the living organism as an openness and exposure to an outside, understood now as it was in Blanchot and Nancy, as a radical exteriority, but rethought in biological terms as an order of radically immanent sense (drawing on the thought of Georges Canguilhem).

In order to explore how this thinking might allow a reframing of Blanchot's initial insights into the status of narrative voice the paper will conclude with an analysis of Pascal Quignard's 2002 text *Les Ombres errantes*. It will argue that the narrative fragmentation and ontological/epistemological equivocation of Quignard's text marks destitution and disappropriation of subjectivity in its exposure to an ungraspable and radical immanence of material life.

18. Is the Grand Narrative of Rights at Its End?

Jean-François Kervégan (Paris 1 Panthéon Sorbonne)

In the decade following the collapse of the Soviet bloc, human rights and the rule of law were from then on considered to be indisputable; they were the universal values on which any human society refusing barbarity should be based. However, the current rise of populist and authoritarian regimes shows that this is not the case; there are "alternative" normative proposals according to which, in particular, rights may have to be relativized in the name, for example, of national cohesion or even ethnic identity. How can this reversal be explained other than by the "wickedness" of some leaders?

Niklas Luhmann's systemic analysis of the emergence of the idea of human rights in modern Europe may provide some indirect answers to this question. According to Luhmann, the definition of individuals as rightsholders (and even as holders of certain "inalienable and sacred" rights) is a consequence of the phenomenon of self-differentiation of social systems that characterizes modernity. This phenomenon has led to a shift from a relationship model based on subordination (reciprocity) to a model based on coordination (complementarity). The distinction between (civil) society and the State, conceptualized by Hegel and many philosophers, sociologists and jurists of the 19th and 20th centuries, would thus be one of the structural conditions for the definition of individual or even collective rights.

From this perspective, it can be assumed that the observable decline in the valuation of these rights is itself a collateral effect of a phenomenon of "de-differentiation" which would be one of the characteristics of post-modernity. This phenomenon, of which the rise of nationalisms and the rejection of everything that seems to threaten societal cohesion is an obvious manifestation, may explain why the "great narrative of rights" has lost, for many people, its attractive force.

19. Why Doesn't Laocoön Scream?: Autopoiesis in Art

Vojtěch Kolman (Univerzita Karlova, Praha)

Lessing famously takes the Vatican Laocoön group and asks why the depicted figure of Laocoön, in a situation of obvious agony, does not scream. In answering this, he arrives at what he interprets as the substantial difference between two types of art, painting and poetry. Unlike poetry, Lessing argues, paintings lack the temporal dimension and thus, in dealing with actions, must create the required effect by spatial means. These consist in creating tension between the *executed* moment (the here and now) and the moment to be *stipulated* so that we can get the given piece of art right. – And that is why the depicted Laocoön does not scream as he *should*, showing, instead, what seems to be a rather mild discomfort.

I find the given explanation compelling if only because of its *structural* rather than purely *descriptive* nature, as represented by Lessing's main antagonist Johann Joachim Winckelmann. As such, it can be used for epistemological purposes and linked to what I would call a *narrative model of experience.* At first, this is just a fancy word representing the rejection of the standard theories of truth based on the correspondence between the cognition *and* the cognized matter. I call it the *causal model of experience*, with an extended use of the word "causal". – So, e.g., Winckelmann's competing explanation of Laocoön's expression based on the claim that the Greek spirit was too noble to scream might be called causal in this sense.

I will arrive at the full-fledged *narrative model* later, in connection with identifying the main shortcoming in Lessing's argument in the underlying *homogeneity principle*. According to this, the temporal and spatial structure of the given media is directly transferred to the depicted objects as well. This is easily shown to be unsustainable, obscuring the *essential point* of Lessing's structural analysis. Based on the examples from other temporal arts such as music and drama, I elaborate on this analysis, transposing it, first, to the art in general, and, second, to the experience as such. Along this line, the narrative model turns out to manifest the experience's *autopoietic* nature and, most importantly, the specific role of art in it.

20. A Specific Form of Self-Creation in German Romantic Painting: The Windows of Caspar David Friedrich

Katalin Kovács (Szegedi Tudományegyetem)

Romanticism promoted all forms of subjectivity. In parallel with the poetic trend of exploring the "depths of the soul", the painting of this period also privileged the role of the creative individual. During the artistic creation, however, a creation of oneself also takes place; in other words, it is a question of a process of *self-creation as an artist* that presupposes the self-reflexivity of the painter. This trend is particularly remarkable in the case of the German romantic painter Caspar David Friedrich, one of the most outstanding artists of his time. His paintings, which are landscapes above all – and which therefore belong to a typically romantic genre –, are results of profound meditation. These works of art often represent metaphysical landscapes including figures with their backs towards the viewer, minute and solitary, mediators between the endless nature and the spectator.

Besides metaphysical landscapes, Friedrich also created drawings of windows which show the view of Dresden from his studio, and in which the window connects the confined space of the studio to that of the open, fluvial landscape. In this regard, many questions arise: can the window offer a view of what is beyond the segment of the landscape visible within the frame? Can it illustrate the process of self-creation in a certain way? This study aims to propose some ways of reflection concerning this notion, based on the analysis of the role of the windows in these drawings of Friedrich, which allow for diverse interpretations. Does the window in these pictures function as a border which separates two spaces (the artist's studio and the surrounding landscape), or, on the contrary, does it establish some kind of communication between them? Or, on a more abstract and symbolical level, is it possible to consider these drawings of windows as self-portraits of the painter, susceptible to visualise in a certain way his "inner space" and at the same time to illustrate the process of self-creation? By the visual example of Friedrich's window-drawings, we outline reflections on the inherent features of the category of self-creation, which cannot be easily grasped, and which goes hand in hand with self-reflexivity, replacing the drawings of windows in the context of German romantic art.

21. Pictorial Form and the Changes of the Self

Ladislav Kvasz (Univerzita Karlova, Praha/Česká akademie věd, Praha)

The aim of the paper is to use the analysis of the changes of the *pictorial form* in the history of western painting. I will use Wittgenstein's notion of the *pictorial form* that was introduced in the *Tractatus* to analyze pictures, mostly paintings, etchings or drawings that show interesting variations in this respect. A pictorial form comprises all those aspects of a painting which are not explicitly expressed on the canvas but are only displayed in an implicit manner. It turns out that paintings have several such aspects and their systematic study can be followed from the Renaissance, through the Baroque or Impressionist era until Cubism or Abstract art.

We will start with the Renaissance and I will argue that Wittgenstein's notion of the pictorial form offers a much better tool for the analysis of this period than the concept of a symbolic form used by Erwin Panofsky in his famous paper *Die Perespektive als "symbolische Form"* in 1927. Among aspects of a pictorial form I suggest to include the *point of view* (from which the painting is constructed); the *horizon* (this line is not expressed by the painting but is only disclosedby it), the *relation of identity* (e.g. the identical size of tiles forming a pavement, as the painting represents them as diminishing towards the horizon, but we have to understand, that they are the same) or the concept of *space* (space cannot be explicitly represented, as it is invisible, but only implicitly indicated).

The notion of the pictorial form is closely related to the subject and so it can be used as a key for discerning the changes of the self. I will introduce several different kinds of pictorial form and will characterize the particular forms of subjectivity that are characteristic for them. There will appear several interesting relations among these forms of subjectivity. Thus while a perspectivist subject, typical for the Renaissance, is simply watching a landscape from a distance, the projective subject characteristic for Mannerism is in a sense looking at himself watching. Thus a first kind of self-reflexivity appears. In much more sophisticated manner this process repeats itself and so we will end up with a rather interesting spectrum of different ways of relating to oneself.

22. Between Modernity and Postmodernity: Transformation of the Axiological Structuration in Postwar French Literature

Petr Kyloušek (Masarykova Univerzita, Brno)

The works of Pierre Bourdieu and Niklas Luhmann highlighted the processes of empowerment that underlie, among others, the autopoiesis in various domains of art. Their analyses are mainly focused on specifications and specialization of discourses and axiologies.

In reference to Michael Baxandall's works, Pierre Bourdieu shows conditions and circumstances under which each field of art had constituted its own autonomous axiological references in its historical development. He also demonstrates the factors, including market laws, that structure the literary field. However, in his most important study, *Les règles de l'art*, a minor research and time gap can be identified between his analysis devoted to the structuring of literary life and that of the editorial market. While the first point is limited to modernity and the avant-garde period before 1914, the detailed and brilliant exploration focused on data from publishing houses and art galleries reflects the situation after 1945, which means a half-century later.

Our aim is to supplement the data by an overview of new conditions influencing the editorial policy in postwar France that are the consequence of the evolution of the book market itself, in other words, of its autopoiesis. In French literature, the crucial period of change lies between 1940 and 1970. In this span of time, the ways of functioning of the avant-garde literary life had been transformed into post-modern strategies. At the same time, the axiology had changed its logic and structure. What then becomes of the autopoiesis of the literary discourse?

The detailed exemplification will concern one of the movements of the 1940s-1960s – the so called *Hussards* – who represent, by certain signs and attributes, other movements of that period, for instance the Nouveau roman or the Théâtre de l'absurde. The situation is all the more interesting thanks to another factor, because this is a period in which the autonomy of the literary field is temporarily compromised by the incursion of politics following the purges of 1944-1945 which directly affected the literary field.

We hope to be able to show the axiological transformation of the literary field that loses its vertical and hierarchical structuring based on exclusion and accepts a postmodern logic, allowing the fragmentation of aesthetic values and playing in favor of juxtaposition and a horizontal organization as its main structuring processes.

A comparison can then be made with Quebec literature, whose postmodern, inclusive and fragmented axiological structuring could – almost during the same period – manage and achieve an aesthetic integration of politics (and non-literary values in the broad sense) into its literary field. Are we dealing, in that case, with two different autopoietic traditions, conditioned by different cultural and historical situations?

23. Prospects of Philosophy in Art after the End of Art

Šárka Lojdová (Univerzita Karlova, Praha)

In the 1980s, the situation in the artworld led philosophers to the conclusion that art came to an end. The term 'end,' however, is ambiguous in this debate. On the one hand, it refers to exhaustion of particular art forms (such as the end of painting), on the other hand, it corresponds to 'end' the sense of a 'purpose' or 'objective.' In my proposal, I focus on the most elaborated version of the end-of-art thesis pronounced by the American philosopher Arthur C. Danto, who claimed that art came to an end in the *narrative* sense. Danto's conception of the narrative is deeply rooted in his philosophical system since the 1960s when he published his first monography *Analytical Philosophy of History* in which he introduced 'narrative' as a kind of a historical explanation. Accordingly, the end-of-art thesis is fully understandable only in the wider context of Danto's philosophy. However, if we widen the scope of the analysis, a profound tension reveals. On the one hand, Danto holds that history is radically open in that any future event can redescribe the past in retrospect and therefore no claim about the future state of affairs is justified. On the other hand, the claim that a certain narrative of art came to an end and that there will be no master narrative anymore refers to the future. Danto's end-of-art thesis, thus, contradicts his theory of historical explanation advocated in *Analytical Philosophy of History*. Concerning this, I aim to propose an alternative reading of the end-of-art thesis, which would correspond with Danto's philosophy of history.

In the opening sequence of my presentation, I will outline Danto's thoughts on the philosophy of history presented in *Analytical Philosophy of History*, especially his arguments why such claims predicting the future have no place in the historiography. In the second part, I will proceed to the explanation of Danto's narrative end of art completed when art freed itself from the burden of self-definition and entered the era of pluralism in which it is not subordinated to any master narrative, determining what art is and excluding the rest. I aim to show the beforementioned tension between the two claims and to offer an alternative reading of Danto's thesis, which will eliminate its prophetic dimension. Following Noël Carroll's criticism based on the idea of the end-of-art thesis as an orientational narrative, I propose to read Danto's thesis as an appeal to philosophers to modify their attitude towards art. Concerning the distinction between the two meanings of 'end' presented in the opening paragraphs of this abstract, I believe that Danto's end-of-art philosophy works better as a reflection on the purpose of philosophy in post-historical art.

24. Of Gods and Overmen: Heroism and Autopoiesis

Tereza Matějčková (Univerzita Karlova, Praha)

The modern version of the classical philosophical injunction 'know thyself' is 'make thyself', or 'be autopoietic'. The autopoietic lies at the centre of what we understand as modernity – the individual and society build themselves up from themselves, or so the narrative goes. Man creates his world out of himself, his thoughts and intentions, rejecting transcendent worlds. This modern endeavour of the self-made man and world is linked to a peculiar form of heroism, reflected by modern authors. In Hegel's work, we encounter the 'world-historical individual', and in Nietzsche's work, the 'overman'. Their heroism is of a specific kind though; it is founded on the dialectic of power and powerlessness. Man creates himself in his own image and once having achieved this, realizes that, as an individual, he has no power over the world he has created, i.e. over society. Since anything with the tag 'modern' has a built-in dimension of the transient and the finite, modern perspectives on the self and its world show a vivid interest in time. In my presentation, I argue that modern philosophical concepts of the heroic are paradoxically less linked to the 'heroic' intention of bringing about a change in the future as to the 'prosaic' reconciliation with the past, even to its 'recycling'.

25. From Violence to Game: Narrating the Struggle for Recognition in Colonial Contexts

Chiarra Mengozzi (Univerzita Karlova, Praha)

According to Susan Buck Morss' article "Hegel and Haiti", we should read the most famous chapter of Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* keeping in mind not only the French revolution but also and especially one of its most impressive outcomes outside Europe, to wit, the emancipation of slaves in Haiti led by Toussaint Louverture. It is not surprising, therefore, if intellectuals concerned with anti-colonial fights, engaged a dialogue with Hegel's chapter in order to interpret (and modify) power relations between colonised and colonisers. This paper deals with two of the most important and convincing re-writings of the master-slave dialectic in colonial contexts: F. Fanon's chapter "Le nègre et Hegel" in *Peaux noires, masques blancs*, and M. Tournier's philosophical novel, *Vendredi ou les limbes du Pacifique*, which inaugurated a new strain of post-colonial narratives inspired by the history of Robinson Crusoe and Friday, considered by Hegel, in the *Philosophical Propaedeutic*, as an insightful illustration of the two figures of self-consciousness. Both influenced by Kojève's and Sartre's interpretations of Hegel, Fanon and Tournier nevertheless take a critical distance from them and from the original source. The first criticises the alleged reciprocity that would qualify the starting point of Hegel's dialectic and attributes a different meaning to the struggle, letting also emerge the normative frame that precedes every intersubjective relation. The second shows the intrinsic weakness of every form of colonial subjugation, and ironically transforms the struggle for recognition in a parodic game performed by the two protagonists. By emphasising the playful relation between Robinson and Friday, Tournier opens up a new way of conceiving self-creativity (understood as the capacity to reinvent oneself) as an intersubjective enterprise of shared sense-making, which would bypass the need of the struggle and preserve the opacity of the other.

26. Self-Organisation, Self-Similarity and Science of Complex Systems in Music: Music Theory Between Non-Linear Physics, Cognitive Science and Narrativity

Klára Hedvika Mühlová (Masarykova univerzita, Brno)

The contribution brings a current perspective on topic of *autopoiesis* in music, especially emphasising the need for critical view on contemporary practices in construction of methods, enabling to detect systemic phenomena in musical structure, dealing with (and proving) it's communicative abilities. Current research in music theory focuses many interesting, deeply-layered - and interdisciplinary integrative - questions behind the mechanisms of musical coding and communicative functions of organised sound structures, in the society.

Modern research initiatives, focusing musical narrativity, constitution of meaning, or possibilities and rules of finding "musical grammar"; are linked to - and methodologically equipped by - broad appearances of systemic approach in musicology; onset of cognitive perspective (in humanities in general), or by the influence of formal sciences adaptation in the field. Music, and it's abstract language, confronts - in terms of order or universal structural laws - the scientific desire for description and explanation, with the changeability of collective imagery, culture-dependent understading, or cultural evolution.

27. The System Must Construct Itself: Genesis as Autopoietic Principle in Fichte's 1804 *Wissenschaftslehre*

Matthew Nini (McGill University, Montreal)

The later work of Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814) has yet to be fully explored, and is latent with possibilities. The goal of this paper will be to argue that Fichte's 1804 series of lectures on the Wissenschaftslehre establishes an original and radical theory of autopoesis, wherein individuals are the repeated manifestation—or "empty repetitions" to use Fichte's language—of the ineffable whole that is "Life." Insofar as Life is manifested *by* consciousness but cannot be portrayed *in* consciousness, Fichte has given us a post-modern theory of the simulacrum *avant la lettre*. The mechanism behind this development is Genesis, Fichte's term for the assertion that knowledge is never constructed allopoietically, *ex post facto.* I argue that Fichte's theory of Genesis is an early articulation of an autopoietical system, and that contemporary theories of autopoiesis, whether biological (e.g. Francisco Varela) or social (e.g. Niklaus Luhmann) owe a debt to Fichte.

One could argue that insofar as the first (Jena-period) *Wissenschaftslehre* aimed at giving precedence to the practical over the theoretical, its later versions, starting in 1804, embodied the exercise more fully. Now, Fichte was lecturing rather than writing, and his hearers were active participants [*Teilnehmer*] who were meant to perform the system rather than just understand it. Their goal was to become *Wissenschaftslehrers* who could throw away the crutch of speculation once they had reached the end. Gone is the language of the I; the end goal of this new *Wissenschaftslehre* was *Life*, an ineffable totality of which conscious acts of judgment lose sight whenever they establish an object of experience. In this radically immanent system, objects are manifestations of the totality. As individual consciousness, the *Wissenschaftslehrer* need not construct a system—the system constructs itself. The term that designates this self-construction is *Genesis*. Fichte first uses it as part of his re-evaluation of Kant's critical project, claiming that the first and second critiques have no internal term of unity—that is, that the practical and theoretically are entirely heterogenous. Fichte's aim is to provide for a common, internal root to both—in other words, a *genetic deduction*. The critical autopoietical turn in Fichte's system will come when consciousness, by definition non-genetic, is genetically deduced as well. The particular is expressed not as something derived from a whole, but as the very self-expression of that whole.

The epistemological takeaway is that consciousness is always already immersed in this system: understanding is possible because intelligibility has already been assumed. The entry point into such a system is attention to the compelling nature (in the sense of "compelling evidence") of objects. If the *Wissenschaftslehrers* will just pay attention to the fact *that* objects are intelligible, stresses Fichte, they come to the conclusion that understanding and intelligibility mutually condition each other, and that this mutual conditioning is itself their shared internal ground. Objects constitute a limited series, and the series provides a framework within which a particular object makes sense.

28. What You See is What You See: Hegel's End of Art and Minimalism

Andrea Piras (Università degli Studi di Sassari)

In this paper my aim is twofold: a) I want to provide an interpretation, which I believe is new, of the famous 'end of art' thesis, contained in Hegel's lectures on fine art; b) on the basis of this reading, I intend to show that Hegel's thought on that issue may be relevant to express a very interesting interpretation of one of the most influential art movements of the contemporary scene, namely Minimalism.

Regarding the first point, I claim that Hegel's thesis of the 'end' of art should not be meant as its radical disappearance but as the transition to a new form of art closely connected with philosophical thought. Indeed, according to Hegel, from its beginnings to the modern age, art had been linked to the necessity to express religious contents in sensuous form; now, due to the secularization of the modern society and the fact that *philosophy* has finally acquired the role to express truth in its most adequate mode, the *religious* function of art is no longer needed, so that the aesthetic creativity needs to recreate itself, to overcome itself (*sich selbst aufhebt*) to radically transform its essential function. The form of this new development of art, detached from religious implications, is what I call art-philosophy, namely a new mode of creative expression that confronts and challenges conceptual thought in referring to the question: what is human? My main line of argument will be linked to the consideration that art cannot lose its absolute role in the system of spirit, of which philosophy represents its highest expression, because otherwise human self-consciousness would end up weakened and poorer; on the contrary spirit (and philosophy) still needs art in order to fully express its potentiality.

Regarding the second point, Minimalism, with its tendency to propose visual forms devoid of any reference to a content different from the highly abstract appearance of the artwork itself ("what you see is what you see" famously said the artist Frank Stella) seems to provide a concrete example of what art would look like after its 'end', namely once it has overcome its religious function and reached a more thoughtful and abstract status. Indeed, Minimalism has often been associated with conceptual art. However, my suggestion is precisely the opposite, namely that Minimalism is an example of what art after its end, according to my reading of Hegel's thesis, should *not* be. Indeed, while Minimalism stresses the idea that art should get rid of any reference to (all too) human contents, such as feelings, representations, narratives and try to render abstract shapes and materials, Hegel's idea of a new self-creating art should turn to explore a new 'holy' dimension of reality, namely human self-reflection in its purest, philosophical form.

29. Politicising Luhmann with Deleuze and Guattari: Capitalism, Autopoiesis and Political Sense-Making

Hannah Richter (University of Hertfordshire)

This paper performs a theoretical synthesis between the post-foundationalist social systems theory of Niklas Luhmann and the critical philosophy of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari to explore contemporary politics as a self-narrating, relational form. It will be argued that the functional differentiation which characterises advanced capitalist societies conditions an autopoietic, self-affective politics which continuously produces *something political* within the relations of sense that make up society and its constituents. Here, the provision of orientation in sense through the production of political issues that demand attention and decision replaces an effectively steering political decision-making.

In the first part of the paper I will briefly establish the theoretical ground which allows me to link the writings of Deleuze and Guattari to Luhmann's systems theory. It will be shown how all three thinkers share a theoretical interest in unpacking how the relations of the human consciousness, and the social assemblages it is embedded in, produce the world as it can be known in a way which is profoundly shaped by emergent, path-dependencies – Luhmann's systems and Deleuze and Guattari's machines. While Deleuze and Luhmann term the unit of this production sense, it is an equivalently conceptualised desire which, in Deleuze and Guattari, anchors a post-foundationalist account of how a relational middle ground continuously reproduces itself between structuration and openness, territorialisation and deterritorialisation.

Against this background, the second part of the paper will draw out the parallelism between the historical evolution of Deleuze and Guattari's desiring machines and the history of systemic differentiation in Luhmann. Using the Marxist underpinnings of Deleuze and Guattari's theory, the contemporary state of deterritorialised flows or autopoiesis against continuously returning complexity will be identified as the functional logic of capitalism, defined by the totalising, self-reproductive relationality of capital in Marx. In both Deleuze and Guattari and Luhmann, the free-flowing, immanent complexity which characterises this social relationality affects the possibility for political governance in the same way. Where, in the words of Deleuze and Guattari, the despotic machine previously held the power to order all societal relations, the ungovernable complexity of capital reduces it to a "post-mortem despotism" which can only retroactively code the social flows it cannot control. [4]

Luhmann's theory, given a critical twist through Deleuze and Guattari, then makes it possible to hone in on how this - effectively powerless - politics functionally persists. Drawing on Luhmann's posthumously published *Die Politik der Gesellchaft* (2002), it will be argued that the autopoietic system of contemporary politics reproduces itself by *holding ready* the capacity for effective political decision-making rather than performing it – by continuously demonstrating that political decisions are possible and

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[4] Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus. Capitalism and Schizophrenia* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983): 228.

necessary. Contemporary politics thereby adopts the orientating social function which was previously held by religion and morality in modern Western societies: it momentarily reduces complexity by territorialising sense to provide society with the urgent matters, risks or crises which define its state at a particular point in time.

30. Self-Healing Social Life

Arvi Särkelä (Universität Luzern) and Arto Laitinen (Tampere University)

This paper addresses the relationship between a social theorist, social participants, and social life. If the object of social philosophy is social life, then what is the position and function of the social philosopher understood as a physician or "pathologist" diagnosing that life?

i) A communitarian (or direct realist) common sense view holds that social life requires participatory understandings from the participants, for its very existence and for being maintained in existence. (See e.g. collective intentionality approach to social ontology: something exists if it is collectively accepted as existing.) These understandings include evaluative and normative conceptions, and all participants are thereby also social critics – "everyone knows how to complain", as Walzer would put it. The role of the theorist is to be a participant, an articulator, a sharp-eyed journalist. (Living traditions may change and evolve gradually, by changing one plank at a time in Neurath's boat, but too radical or revolutionary transformations are an anathema in this approach: they amount to sinking the boat by drilling holes without any planks to replace them. Cf. e.g the opening scenario in MacIntyre's After Virtue).

ii) While the participatory understandings are culturally mediated and learnt, the first approach may be too immediate in two ways: it may first of all provide a too "flat ontology" and secondly, it may seem normatively less than fully critical (despite the understandings available to participants which provide some critical friction). A sociological perspective a la Durkheim or Bourdieu *et al* can be well suited to fix the former by holding that there may be more to social reality and social structures than meets a participant's eye. One must take critical distance to get objective knowledge about the tendencies and dispositions of social reality. That threatens to lead to an unfortunate dualism however: the dynamics of the social life, its autopoietic tendencies, are external to and independent from social theories or philosophy criticizing the form of life (cf. also Luhmann and Habermas). And correspondingly, a normative perspective a la Kant or Rawls et al can aim at fuller critical distance by bracketing actuality and focussing on how things ought to be. This creates a dualism as well.

Can the good sides of the two approaches be combined? The first approach is desirable in seeing the social critic/physician/pathologist as embodying the social life, the second approach is desirable in alerting to the fact that there may be more to be captured in social reality, and that there may be need (and perhaps potential) for transformation and not mere maintenance of the social form of life?

iii) In this paper we wish to explore an approach that combines these points: the social critic does not dualistically see the tendencies and the autopoiesis of society as (a) external to her own practice but (b) as internal to it. Yet, in this approach the aim is not (c) maintenance of form but (d) potentially transformative self-creation. And

further, the position of the social critic/ theorist/ philosopher need not be that of (e) direct participant position but can be (f) one that takes critical distance.

In this approach the relationship between the critic and social life is not dualistic but social life is itself of the kind that heals its own wounds: it is self-healing in that it heals itself by means of social criticism, theory, or philosophy. Hegel (in the *Phenomenology* section on Conscience) and Nietzsche would say this, yet in very different ways. The Hegelian model is that of reconciliation (*Versöhnung*) via forgiveness/absolute recognition, the power, *alle Wunden des Geistes zu heilen, ohne dass Narben bleiben*. The Nietzschean model is that of affirmation (*Bejahung*), the plastic power to be the healer: *Philosoph als Arzt der Kultur*.

This approach can use the Hegelian distinction between an abstract negation of a dualism, and an overcoming of it. Therefore, this approach differs from the first view in that it allows for more radical transformations, or at least gives philosophy a more constructive task. The (apparently detached) theorist's viewpoint is one of the viewpoints that social life can take to itself, and the maintenance of complex societies will require such expert understandings (not readily available to a participant or generalist journalist; cf. also Honneth on *Moral Consciousness and Class Domination*, and Dewey on *Public and Its Problems*). Further, it is not merely the maintenance but self-transformation of social life that works this way.

31. Narrating Transcendence

Christian Schmidt (Universität Leipzig)

As was often recognised, biblical narratives create a sense of history. There is an inherent tension between forming a community and the appeal to transcend the existing social order in these texts. Instead of regarding biblical religion as specialised social systems only, I therefore propose to investigate the transformative organisations that rely on biblical texts. Those organisations seek to permeate all social, political and juridical life. In the paper I will analyse the narrative constructions and specific structures of such self-transcending communities and discuss their sometimes dangerous potential.

32. "Sketch for a Self-Analysis": Self-Reflexive Aspects of Contemporary Literary Theory

Josef Šebek (Univerzita Karlova, Praha)

In the discourse of contemporary literary theory, self-relexive elements are anything but rare. They can be mere rhetorical devices intended to "cover" the inherent claim to universal epistemological validity of the research. However, there also exists a tendency to question the privileged position of the scholar and to stress that any research is always situated – historically, socially, epistemologically (cf. Harraway's "situated knowledge"). Almost regularly, this leads to the narrativization of researcher's own background, her personal "stakes", her broader (political, pedagogical etc.) aims etc. The result can be a genuine attempt to bring personal aspects of the research to the fore. What difference this self-reflexive narrativization makes from the theoretical point of view?

In my paper I will briefly sketch the context of the ongoing "self-reflexive turn" in the humanities (beginning perhaps with Bronislaw Malinowski or later Renato Rosaldo) and then I will focus on two different important cases of "self-reflexivity" in literary theory. My paradigmatic examples will be Pierre Bourdieu and Raymond Williams, two major figures of cultural and social theory.

Bourdieu's research has often been interpreted in the framework of (self-)reflexivity – not only his theory of practice as such (esp. the introduction of *habitus*) but also his approach to the role of the researcher (the notion of autoanalysis conceived as a self-reflexive socioanalysis, following the model of Freud's auto/psycho/analysis; see his *Esquisse pour une auto-analyse*, 2004). This tendency can be traced in many of his writings; on the other hand, there is also a strong objectivist undercurrent (the structuralist legacy) and "autoanalysis" does not always equal self-reflexivity. I will examine how the subject of the researcher is construed and sometimes narrated in his works on cultural production and literature and how this self-reflexive element influences his sociology of culture in a deeper way.

Also Raymond Williams' texts have strong tendency towards self-reflexivity, beginning with the narratives of his social origin and his cultural experience (cf. already in "Culture is Ordinary", 1958). In his view cultural theory is always situated and in this sense political. The social and political commitment then informs the self-reflexive aspect of his "cultural materialism". Furthermore, he conceives art and literature as modes of social self-creation.

In the final part of my paper I will compare the epistemological, ethical, political and pragmatic dimensions of the two approaches. In the discourse of contemporary literary theory, there are other important authors perhaps even more firmly grounded in (often narratively conceived) self-reflexivity (cf. Roland Barthes, Stephen Greenblatt, Fredric Jameson, Derek Attridge…). However, Bourdieu and Williams represent the types of self-reflexivity in literary criticism that have had strong impact on current debates (comp. contemporary French discussions about Bourdieu's "objecitivism" – Bernard Lahire, Didier Eribon, Geoffroy de Lagasnerie and others).

33. Being in the World as Self-Making: Logic and Concept of a Personal Life

Pirmin Stekeler-Weithofer (Universität Leipzig)

The notion of *being a personal subject* is most intricate. It demands, as Hegel sees, a logically correct understanding of reflective terms like "being", "subject", and "person", by which we talk about different 'moments' of ourselves as human beings sideways on. Moreover, in most cases we must not identify the grammatical subject to which the words "I" refers with my individual body during some parts of my life-time. We rather should reconstruct, with Heidegger, Socratic and Christian mythological talk about our eternal soul as the final result in our self-making by perfecting one's own personhood, striving for true self-knowledge and conscience.

34. Autopoiesis in the Revealed Religion

Preston Stovall (Univerzita Hradec Králové)

In conversation Robert Brandom has said that the Religion chapter could have been removed without loss to Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* (cf. the opening sentences of "Confession and Forgiveness", chapter 14 p. 166 of Part 5 of the 2014 manuscript of *A Spirit of Trust*). In this essay I argue that Brandom's narrative about the processes whereby contentfulness accrues to concepts over time does not account for the institution of the concept Hegel is most interested in: the self-conscious historical person. It will take the religious practices of the Revealed Religion (exemplified by Christianity), as conceived through the standpoint of Absolute Knowing, to explicate that concept. For it is Christianity that teaches to a people that its idea of itself as a collective depends upon its individual members *making themselves into* the sort of collective defined by that idea. In this regard the standpoint arrived at in Absolute Knowing involves autopoiesis: it is a practical activity that guarantees the truth of what one thinks of oneself, in virtue of making it the case that one actually is as one conceives oneself to be.

For Hegel the ceremony and instruction provided by Christianity, particularly concerning the notion of sacrifice and renewal, is the means whereby the abstract form of collective self-consciousness described at the end of the Spirit chapter became explicit to a people in history. This notion of *sacrifice* is crucial to the mythos of Christianity – the process of coordinating our individual and social identities requires we give up various things we might otherwise like to be or have. This is true of our physical needs and wants, but it also characterizes our social lives: political negotiation in an autonomous society requires accommodation. We thereby *make it so* that the things sacrificed truly are inessential to us, while helping to make it actual that we are as we made the sacrifice to be. This is a lesson we learn in the Self-Consciousness chapter when the struggle to the death results in the master's victory over the bondsman: by his willingness to sacrifice his life for his autonomy, the master has made it *true* of himself that his physical life is inessential to his identity as autonomous (of course through his labors the bondsman comes to learn that physicality *is* essential to one's identity, though after another fashion).

For a society to collectively recognize that this is the character of its existence, some institution must teach this recognition. The religious cult of Revelation communicates this idea in picture-thinking form via the story of the godman's death and rebirth in a spirit that suffuses a community whose members vicariously take part in this sacrifice (Revealed Religions of this sort were widespread throughout the ancient Greco-Roman world). The conceptually explicit shape this idea takes in Absolute Knowing is the practical self- knowledge that one has in reflecting on the significance of the traditions that have actually instituted the *Geistige* contour of "the *we* that is *I* and the *I* that is *we*" (§177). This is to say that Absolute Knowing involves a *first-person plural self-knowledge*, arrived at by autopoiesis, and communicated in religious guise. For all that, it is possible that other institutions might play or supplement this role today, and Rorty's discussion in *Achieving our Country* suggests that a sort of *civic nationalism* might be fit for the 21st century (time permitting I hope to raise this possibility for discussion).

35. Performative Turn: Limits and Advantages of its Application to Early-Modern French Theatre

Záviš Šuman (Univerzita Karlova, Praha)

In my paper I will focus on Erika Fischer-Lichte's concept of "autopoietic feedback-ribbon" (*Ästhetik des Performativen*, 2002). I argue that her set of characteristics belonging to our modern era find some important predecessors in the early modern theatre, especially when it comes to pragmatic factors pertaining to what one might call Aesthetics of effect oriented towards the spectator, for example the role of aesthetic affects, dialectics between the actor and the spectator, notional liminality. My overwhelming goal is to show in what way and why some of these new conceptualizations could and ought to enrich the existing research on Early-Modern French theatre. Main focus will be devoted to the role of the theatre within the theatre in plays by Brosse, Corneille and Rotrou.

36. Textus interpres sui: What Does It Mean?

Denis Thouard (CNRS, Paris/Humboldt Universität, Berlin)

Self-reflexive features seem to be a requisit of modernity. A plain view of things will be too often seen as naive. But who wants to be taken as naive?

In the history of hermeneutics, the principle of autonomy and autosufficiency of the object of interpretation is already well known at Alexandria (Homeron ex Homerou saphenizein) and often reassessed in different times, mainly at the Renaissance and during the Reformation.

It is the occasion to question the feature of reflexivity (auto-) as applied to textual items. Is it so that we don't at all need to face any author when we interpret? what about our own subjectivity as interpreters? Is the idea of a "self-interpretation" practicable? and what does it mean, if not?

The paper will take into account not only the textual, philosophical and biblical tradition, but also the mythological one (represented by the Schelling-Coleridge Line of the tautegoric interpretation).

37. Worlds Mean Words Mean Words Mean Worlds: Versions of the Aesthetic Self

Thierry Tremblay (L-Università ta' Malta)

The historicist conception of Modern aesthetics as a dynamic through which every medium acquires its progressive autonomy through a long process of a subjectivation of the subject, and the correlative objectivation of the object, goes hand to hand with artistic practices tending to autotelism, and, finally, to radical self-referentiality.

The work of art or the work of literature is therefore in a problematic relationship to exteriority, either absorbing subjectively all what is external or being incapable of reaching a desubjectivized exteriority (what was commonly known, before Modernity, as straightforward reality).

The essence of self-referentiality being ultimately the *uncommunicable* (a sign making reference to its own vanishing experience), all communication – including the *communication of the uncommunicable* – must therefore pass by a common ground, or token, even if the task is to renew the role of the elements through which some form of togetherness is achieved, as Mallarmé puts it in its programmatic maxim: "*Donner un sens plus pur aux mots de la tribu*".

If the world is the sum of its versions, the sum of its revealed versions, each of these versions can be in a complex relation with the world, and, ironically, each *real* small version is a monad where the ideal sum is an abstract big totality.

This paper will evoke forms of autopoiesis that have in common both a problematic relationship to exteriority *and* the creation of a self-referential imaginary space. The goal of the paper is to draw the closure, or horizon, of the drive for self-referentiality, and to question the τέλος of an aesthetics of a pure subjective totality.

By evoking mainly works of literature that have reached original autopoeitic configurations, here understood as 'ways of world-making', we will ask ourselves in which sense an aesthetical practice can be a *construction of the self* and a *self-construction*, what can be the finality of self-referential works of imagination and, finally, what is the status of *fiction* in self-referential aesthetic practices.

38. The Paradox of Reason: Self-Reflexivity and Criticism of Rationality

Lars-Thade Ulrichs (Evangelische Hochschule RWL, Bochum)

Based on Kant, we may establish that one entertains a *rational* relation to one's own convictions and attitudes, and equally to others, only once one has realized their *need to be rationally well-founded* as well as their *unfoundedness*. One has to recognize the overall *necessity* of rational grounding while simultaneously realizing that nothing can ever be *sufficiently* grounded, a fact that might be called "the paradox of reason." It is Kant's epochal achievement to have formulated this paradox. In the beginning of the history of *reason* (*Vernunft*), that is not identical with mere *rationality*, we encounter a double *recursive* and *self-reflexive* insight—the consciousness of its own *irreplaceability* and its *insufficiency*. Only when this concept of self-reflexive rationality that is simultaneously self-determination and determination of its limits has been formulated can we proceed to the distinction and criticism of more differentiated concepts of rationality.

39. Self-Reflection and Crisis: Transformation Processes of Modern Law

Benno Zabel (Universität Bonn)

Law and equality are the promise of liberal modernity. Law and equality should guarantee (as a legal equality) individual or collective freedom and help to preserve social contingency experiences. This applies in particular to societies that no longer want to and can no longer support themselves as functionally differentiated and largely secularly organized, and generally accepted, other orientation media. However, as law advances to the normative leading medium, it becomes self-referential and hegemonic. Law should regulate, intervene and moderate conflicts in procedural form. That it should provide coherence where, in the words of Hegel, the emergency and rational state, the system of needs prevails. The accompanying dynamic is part of the modern age and its culture of legitimacy. For law, at the same time, establishes autonomy and authority, enables emancipation and subjugation (dominion spheres), participation and alienation. In dealing with this dynamic, one-sided interpretive patterns are often presented: According to this law, the law can only redeem its guarantees of freedom if it fulfills either its claim of authority and order or its emancipation and partial hire achievements. But to understand the right of modernity means to combine both sides of this dynamic, form and content of the protection of freedom. Law has to be reconstructed as an institutional network that processes common knowledge, experiences and expectations in a meaningful way, but is also exposed to or even exacerbates the various power interests of society. In this dual-skill modern law is self-reflexive insofar as it is aware of the potential for regression and susceptibility to crises and establishes effective corrective mechanisms. However, this awareness of freedom can only be maintained if law is anchored in the political coexistence of legal subjects (Hegel would have called ethical life); in other words, when it mobilizes practices of judgment that also emphasize the life-world liberty concern in the legislative and legal application techniques.